

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## **AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION**

**A-10C, T/N 79-0141  
MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA  
10 MAY 2010**

On 10 May 2010 at 1655 local time, A-10C, tail number 79-0141, assigned to the 75th Fighter Squadron, 23rd Wing, Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, departed the right edge of runway 18L when the mishap pilot (MP) did not successfully stop the aircraft during an aborted takeoff. As the mishap aircraft (MA) departed the runway, the MP ejected sustaining minor injuries. The MA continued traveling over soft uneven grassland until the nose gear collapsed and the right main landing gear and MA nose became lodged into the ground causing a catastrophic fuselage failure just forward of the right wing's leading edge. The MA stopped approximately 500 feet into the grassland at a 45° angle off the end of the runway. Minutes later, the MA was engulfed in fire due to the ruptured forward main fuel tank. The MA was destroyed with loss valued at \$17,306,077 to include \$52,095 in environmental clean-up on Moody AFB.

As the wingman in the two-ship formation, the MP was briefed to takeoff 20 seconds behind his flight lead. After his flight lead began his takeoff roll, but prior to the MA brake release, the MP realized he had not put on his prescription glasses. The MP released brakes at the 20 second mark; however donning his glasses distracted him from immediately advancing the throttles to their takeoff setting. The MP noted a lower than calculated airspeed at the required airspeed check point 1000 feet down the runway and attributed it to his late application of power, so he continued the takeoff. The MP checked his speed again at 1500-2000 feet and the indicator showed negligible to no change. At 3500 feet, the MP correctly diagnosed a pitot-static issue but elected to continue with the takeoff versus executing an abort. Approaching the calculated takeoff distance, the MP rechecked the airspeed indicator and noted an unexpected airspeed rise to 90-100 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). At the same time, the MP had a visual misperception that the MA was no longer accelerating. The MP concluded that the airspeed indicator was working properly and for an unknown reason the MA was unable to attain the takeoff speed of 136 KIAS. The MP aborted the aircraft with approximately 3500 feet of runway remaining. Evidence supports that the MA was traveling 160-170 KIAS at the time the abort commenced. Due to his perceived lower airspeed, the MP did not apply the required maximum braking. In a final attempt to stop the MA on a prepared surface, the MP attempted a ninety degree right turn onto the last taxiway at the end of the runway. The MP recognized the MA was traveling too fast to complete the turn and subsequently ejected as the MA departed the prepared surface.

The accident investigation board (AIB) president found clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was human factor error. Specifically, the MP's initial decision not to abort the takeoff, and then once the decision to abort was made, the MP applying an inappropriate braking procedure that was based on his perception of being at a lower airspeed. Additionally, the AIB president found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the pitot-static system blockage, task misprioritization, distraction, and procedural error were substantially contributing factors to the mishap.

**Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements.**