

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## **AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION**

**E-9A, T/N 84-000047  
TALLAHASSEE REGIONAL AIRPORT, FLORIDA  
1 MAY 2008**

On 1 May 2008, at 1635 Zulu (Z), or Greenwich Mean Time, an E-9A Widget, Tail Number (T/N) 84-000047, touched down on Runway (RWY) 9 at the Tallahassee Regional Airport (KTLH), Florida (FL) with the landing gear in the up position. The mishap aircraft (MA) is assigned to the 82d Aerial Targets Squadron (82 ATRS), 53d Weapons Evaluation Group (53 WEG), Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), FL. The mishap crew (MC) was conducting an initial qualification training sortie for the mishap upgrade pilot.

All maintenance and preflight activities were normal. The mishap instructor pilot (MIP) was current and qualified to conduct the mission but the upgrade pilot was not qualified in the aircraft. The mishap sortie was the fourth flight for the upgrade pilot in his E-9 copilot upgrade training program.

The MA departed Tyndall AFB at 1602Z and proceeded to KTLH for instrument approaches and emergency procedures training. The mishap sequence began with a simulated single-engine (SSE) instrument landing system approach to RWY 36 with a circling maneuver to RWY 9 for a SSE go-around, followed by a visual traffic pattern with intent to perform a SSE touch-and-go landing. The MC maneuvered to final approach but did not inform the KTLH control tower "gear down" per USAF instructions. Moments before the mishap, the KTLH tower controller observed the MA's landing gear was up and transmitted a warning. The MA subsequently touched down with the landing gear in the up position and slid 2,221 feet down RWY 9. The MC egressed the aircraft uninjured. Damage to government property totaled \$1,457,252. There were no deaths, injuries, or private property damages associated with the mishap. RWY 9-27 at KTLH was shut down for approximately 19 hours during recovery operations.

The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found clear and convincing evidence for the primary cause of the mishap to be failure of the MIP to ensure the aircraft was properly configured for landing. The Board President found sufficient evidence to conclude checklist error and cognitive task oversaturation substantially contributed to the mishap.

*Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statement*

*E-9A, T/N 84-000047, 1 May 2008*