

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

C-21A, T/N 84-0094
ALI AIR BASE, IRAQ
2 NOVEMBER 2009

On 2 November 2009, at approximately 1430 local time (L), a C-21A aircraft, tail number (T/N) 84-0094, departed the far end of the runway at Ali Air Base (AB), Iraq, after landing approximately two-thirds down the runway. The mishap aircraft (MA), assigned to the 375th Air Mobility Wing (AMW), operated out of the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), 379th Expeditionary Operations Group (EOG), C-21 detachment at Al Udeid AB, Qatar. The MA supported Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and Joint Task Force HORN of AFRICA (HOA) operations. The mishap occurred on the first of four scheduled sorties of a combat operational support airlift (OSA) mission. The mishap crew (MC) consisted of the mishap aircraft commander (MP1) and the mishap first pilot (MP2). The MP2 controlled the MA from the left seat during descent, approach, and landing. The MP1, the Pilot in Command, communicated with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and accomplished checklists from the right seat.

During the approach to landing, the MC configured the MA to lose excess altitude. The MA provided multiple audible and visual warnings that the aircraft sink rate was excessive. The MC disregarded these warnings, took no corrective action and failed to complete the required checklist prior to landing. In addition, the MC disregarded the ten knot (kt) tailwind which would have required a new landing distance computation that far exceeded the previously calculated landing distance. As a result of the MA's excessive speed, rate of descent, partial landing configuration and ten kt tailwind, the MA touched down approximately two-thirds down the runway and there was insufficient remaining runway length available for the MA to stop. The MA departed the prepared surface and came to rest 200 feet off the departure end of the runway, sustaining visible damage to the nose cone and the left wing flap. The MA sustained approximately \$1,836,259 million (M) in damage. Crash, Fire, and Rescue responded immediately. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to other property.

The accident investigation board (AIB) president found clear and convincing evidence that the MC failed to sufficiently reduce speed and altitude during their approach to execute a normal landing, failed to complete the appropriate checklist for a high speed partial flap landing, and failed to recognize that there was insufficient runway remaining to safely land. Finally, the MC failed to initiate a "Go-Around" to correct the aforementioned deviations. Additionally, the AIB president also found sufficient evidence that skill-based errors, judgment and decision-making errors, cognitive factors, psycho-behavioral factors, coordination, communication, and planning factors, and planning inappropriate operations all were substantially contributing factors to the mishap.

Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements.